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The Proper Remedy for Possession of Child Pornography
I.	INTRODUCTION

Although child pornography is not a new phenomenon, the Internet has given it
new life.1 Throughout most of the twentieth century, law enforcement agencies have
had considerable success in thwarting the trafficking of hard copy forms of child
pornography.2 With the introduction of the Internet, however, the scale, reach, and
nature of child pornography has dramatically changed.3 The Internet has escalated
the problem of child pornography by allowing convenient, anonymous, and
inexpensive access to a vast quantity of pornographic images from around the globe.4
Further, the Internet facilitates peer-to-peer communication and provides a variety
of formats, including pictures, videos, sound, and real-time interactive experiences,
which have even allowed for live broadcasts of children being sexually abused.5
Essentially, the Internet has created an international playground for those who
produce, purchase, and distribute child pornography. 6 Greater access to child
pornography has created a greater demand and, in turn, a booming industry at the
expense of innocent children.7
The growing Internet market for child pornography has led to a multi-faceted
response to the mere possession of child pornography.8 State and federal legislation
has criminalized this conduct and possessors of child pornography have been actively
prosecuted for their role in this unfortunate business.9 Recently, victims of child
pornography have taken a new stand against the possessors of their images by
1.

See Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Child Pornography on
the Internet 5 (2012).

2.

See id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 9.

5.

Id. at 11–12.

6.

See Adam D. Lewis, Dollars and Sense: Restitution Orders for Possession of Child Pornography Under 18
U.S.C. § 2259, 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 413, 415 (2011) (“The internet has also
allowed child predators to network, more easily groom potential victims, cyber-stalk, contact child
prostitutes, and engage in child trafficking.”).

7.

See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 773 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By possessing, receiving, and distributing
child pornography, defendants collectively create the demand that fuels the creation of the abusive
images.”); Lewis, supra note 6, at 415 (“Even with state and federal law enforcement targeting child
pornographers, approximately 20,000 new images of child pornography are uploaded to the internet
each week. As such, child pornography remains a multi-billion dollar market.”).

8.

See Lewis, supra note 6, at 423 (“Congress continues to funnel resources to federal and state law
enforcement . . . [while] [t]he Supreme Court recognized that only the elimination of child pornography
networks can truly rid society of child pornography.”).

9.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting the receipt and possession of child pornography); Ohio v.
Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding an Ohio criminal statute prohibiting the mere possession of
child pornography because of the gravity of the state’s interests). The U.S. Department of Justice
established the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section within its Criminal Division to handle crimes
relating to the sexual exploitation of children, including the possession of child pornography. See Child
Exploitation and Obscenity Section Mission, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
ceos/mission/mission.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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requesting restitution.10 Victims of child pornography can suffer psychological and
emotional harm each time an image of their abuse is viewed.11 Restitution allows a
victim to request a court to order a defendant to pay the victim, as part of the
defendant’s criminal sentence, for the extent of the victim’s losses.12 Therefore, as a
part of sentencing proceedings, victims who experience this harm are now requesting
defendants reimburse them for the harm caused by the mere viewing and possessing
of their images.13
While “[i]t has long been uncontroversial to order restitution when the defendant
is convicted of actual physical abuse of a child or of producing images constituting
child pornography,” 14 ordering restitution from these “end-users” 15 of child
pornography has provoked debate.16 The main issue involves the abstract, and at
times controversial, notion that simply possessing images can cause a victim harm; to
some, the connection often feels too attenuated to justify the liability assigned
through criminal restitution.17 Apart from this debate, this note contends that there
are additional problems in the current restitution framework that demonstrate why it
is wrongly applied in possession cases. Particularly, restitution is inconsistently
10.

E.g., John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution at a Price Set by the Victim, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 2010, at A19.

11.

See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010).

The simple fact that the images have been disseminated perpetuates the abuse initiated
by the producer of the materials. Consumers such as [defendant] who “merely” or
“passively” receive or possess child pornography directly contribute to this continuing
victimization. Having paid others to “act out” for him, the victims are no less damaged
for his having remained safely at home[.]

Id.; Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (“The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims
continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”); United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251,
1260 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that individuals depicted in images of child pornography experience “the
emotional and psychic pain of knowing that the images are being viewed”).
12.

See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 932
(1984) (“A restitution order requires the criminal offender to pay money or to render services to his
victim in order to redress the loss he has inflicted.”); United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 496 (4th
Cir. 2006) (holding that restitution is penal in nature and part of a defendant’s sentence).

13.

Lewis, supra note 6, at 413 (“Victims have begun seeking compensation from anyone in possession of
the images, not just the person responsible for producing the pornography.”).

14.

United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (D. Me. 2009).

15.

“End-users” are those who merely possess and collect child pornography and benefit from the images
produced and distributed by others; but they are not themselves involved in production or distribution.

16.

See Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (“A review of the cases decided thus far shows that victims’ success in
obtaining restitution has varied significantly in district courts across the country.”); infra note 73 and
accompanying text.

17.

See Schwartz, supra note 10 (highlighting a George Washington University Law professor’s argument
that the application of restitution in this context “stretches personal accountability to the breaking
point”); Dina McLeod, Section 2259 Restitution Claims and Child Pornography Possession, 109 Mich. L.
Rev. 1327, 1330 (2011) (explaining that the hesitancy of some judges to award restitution in possession
cases is based on questions about the casual link between the victim’s harm and the defendant’s conduct
and whether that link is too tenuous).
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administered, results in both disproportionate punishments and liability, and fails to
adequately meet victims’ needs. In response, this note proposes that, instead of
relying on courts to order restitution in possession cases, Congress should establish a
victim compensation fund that would uniformly reimburse victims for the harm
caused by possessors.
Part II of this note will survey the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing
not only the production and distribution of child pornography, but also the mere
possession of child pornography. This section will also provide an overview of the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which governs the application of
restitution to the crime of child pornography possession. Part III will then offer a brief
investigation into the major problems caused by applying the current restitution
framework to possession cases. First, courts have split on the application of the MVRA
to the crime of possession, which has created inconsistencies that are detrimental to
both defendants and victims.18 Second, restitution amounts can be disproportionate to
the offense, which risks violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
excessive fines and minimizes the liability placed on producers.19 Finally, the current
framework does not adequately meet the needs of victims;20 specifically, they are left
unsatisfied with unpaid restitution orders and revictimized through offender
notifications.21 Still other victims, who are not identified until after the defendant’s
conviction, are unable to petition for restitution from that defendant at all.22
In light of these problems, Part IV will explain this note’s proposal for
congressional action. Specifically, Congress should remove the crime of child
pornography possession from the scope of the MVRA, which would prohibit courts
18.

See Robert William Jacques, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal Restitution Framework for Child
Pornography Victims, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1167, 1173, 1181–82 (2011) (arguing that the split among courts on
the interpretation of the MVRA calls for congressional action).

19.

See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1334, 1344.

20. See Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

of 1996, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1687, 1689–90 (2009) (arguing against the MVRA framework and proving
guidance for a return to restorative justice).

21.

Victims are notified each time another individual has been arrested for possessing their image. This is
accomplished through the Victim Notification System (VNS), which is authorized under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3771 (West 2009). VNS is a network of federal law enforcement agencies that provides victims with
information about any case that involves them. The Department of Justice Victim Notification System, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, https://www.notify.usdoj.gov/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
VNS is a cooperative effort between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), the United States Attorneys’ offices,
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). This free, computer-based system provides
important information to victims. In many cases you will receive letters generated
through VNS containing information about the events pertaining to your case and/or
any defendants in the case.

Id.; see also United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (focusing on a
victim’s painful reaction to offender notifications).
22.

Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194 (finding that the Internet’s anonymity makes identifying victims more
difficult).
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from ordering restitution from possessors.23 However, victims should not be deprived
of the opportunity for adequate compensation. Therefore, Congress should establish
a federal victim compensation system, where a defendant, as part of his sentence,
would pay into a special fund instead of directly paying the victim. 24 The funds
would then be dispersed to eligible victims of child pornography.25 Congress should
adopt a model based on the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement
Fund (ITVERP), which provides compensation to victims of international
terrorism. 26 A compensation program modeled after ITVERP would solve the
problems associated with the current restitution model, as applied to the crime of
possession, by providing a uniform approach that would create consistency for both
victims and offenders, avoid disproportionate punishments and liability for endusers, and, overall, better satisfy victims’ needs.
II.	THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
RESTITUTION

A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Prohibiting Possession of Child Pornography

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have addressed the issue of child
pornography as it has grown and developed. 27 Rooted in the notion that “[a]
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens,” 28 the Court has permitted state
legislatures and Congress to place more and more restraints on production,
distribution, and, finally, possession. 29 In 1982, the year of the seminal Supreme
Court case New York v. Ferber, the vast majority of states and Congress had passed
statues prohibiting the production and distribution of child pornography. 30
Recognizing the extensive state legislative findings and acknowledging psychological
research that focused on penalizing distribution as the most effective way to combat
the problem, 31 the Court in Ferber held that child pornography was outside the
protection of the First Amendment and upheld a New York statute that prohibited a
23.

See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1342–45 (explaining the serious policy concerns associated with holding
possessors liable under § 2259).

24.

See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (suggesting a statutory
provision requiring fines for child pornography be paid into a victim compensation fund), vacated, In re
Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012).

25.

See Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 793 n.12.

26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10603c (West 2008).
27.

See Lewis, supra note 6, at 416.

28. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
29. Id. at 760; Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 103 (1990).
30. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749. By 1982, forty-seven states had outlawed the production and distribution of

child pornography. Id.

31.

Id. at 758 n.9, 760.
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person from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children by disseminating
materials depicting these performances.32
In Ferber, the Court acknowledged the grave consequences of the child
pornography industry and declared that “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”33 In
upholding the the New York statute, the Court found these pornographic materials
“bear[] so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production
. . . that it is permissible to consider these materials without the protection of the
First Amendment.”34 Further, the Court suggested a solution: “[t]he most expeditious
if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for
this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or
otherwise promoting the product.”35
Less than ten years later, in 1990, nineteen states had statutes prohibiting simple
possession, the first of which was enacted in 1987—a short time after the birth of
the Internet.36 Accordingly, in its Ohio v. Osborne decision, the Court furthered this
trend of state legislatures and upheld an Ohio statute criminalizing the possession
child pornography.37 The Court explained:
Given the importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child
pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all
levels in the distribution chain. According to the State, since the time of our
decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven
underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child
pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution.38

32.

Id. at 774. The relevant part of the New York statute is as follows:

A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual performance if knowing the character
and content thereof he employs, authorizes or induces a child less than sixteen years of
age to engage in a sexual performance or being a parent, legal guardian or custodian of
such a child, he consents to the participation by such child in a sexual performance.

N.Y. Penal Law § 263.05 (McKinney 1980).
33.

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.

34. Id. at 764. More specifically, the Court in Ferber found child pornography was unprotected under the

First Amendment regardless of whether the materials were “obscene,” which is a separate area of
unprotected speech. Id. at 755–57.

35.

Id. at 760.

36. Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 110–11 n.6 (1990).
37.

Id. at 103.

38. Id. at 110 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). The relevant part of the Ohio statute

is as follows:

(A) No person shall do any of the following:
...

(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the
person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies:
(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled,
brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic,
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The Court also identified an additional interest in upholding the Ohio law, stressing
that child pornography is a permanent record of a victim’s abuse that “causes the
child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”39 The
state’s ban on mere possession, therefore, would motivate possessors to destroy the
materials, which, in time, would help to end the cycle of distribution and, in turn,
end a victim’s continuing harm.40 In the end, by depriving the possession of child
pornography of any constitutional protection, the Court approved the climate of
intolerance created by state legislatures.41
B. Congress’s Introduction of the Criminal Restitution Framework

Beginning in the late 1970s, a victims’ rights movement had emerged, arguing
that the criminal justice system had become overly offender-focused and lacked
sensitivity to victim needs.42 In response to the movement and rising crime rates,
President Ronald Reagan commissioned the Task Force on Victims of Crime, which
conducted studies and made policy suggestions to improve the position of victims in
the criminal justice system.43 A central focus of the task force and movement was the
importance of a victim’s right to receive restitution from their perpetrator.44 Shortly
thereafter, in 1982, Congress introduced restitution into the federal sentencing
guidelines with the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA).45

medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper
purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person
pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, member of the clergy, prosecutor,
judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.
(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing
to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in
which the material or performance is used or transferred.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323 (West 2012).
39.

Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.

40. Id.
41.

See id.

42.

Dickman, supra note 20, at 1687; see Katherine Giblin, Click, Download, Causation: A Call for Uniformity
and Fairness in Awarding Restitution to Those Victimized by Possessors of Child Pornography, 60 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 1109, 1115 (2011) (suggesting the existence of proximate cause between possession and victim
injuries and proposing congressional action to set monetary boundaries for judges in setting restitution
amounts).

43.

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime: Final Report (1982)
[hereinafter President’s Task Force].

44. Giblin, supra note 42, at 1116; President’s Task Force, supra note 43, at 33 (“Legislation should be

proposed and enacted that would . . . [r]equire restitution in all cases, unless the court provides specific
reasons for failing to require it.”).

45.

Pub. L. No. 97–291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2006)).
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Prior to the VWPA, courts rarely ordered or enforced restitution, granting it
only as a condition of probation.46 But because of the movement, and at the request
of the president’s task force, Congress dramatically altered the federal restitution
framework by encouraging courts to impose restitution with the VWPA. Specifically,
the VWPA granted courts discretion to order restitution independent of probation
and “in conjunction with imprisonment, fine, suspended sentence, or other sentence
imposed by the court.”47 This discretion, however, was limited, requiring courts to
consider “the financial resources and other assets of the defendant . . . projected
earnings and other income of the defendant and any financial obligations of the
defendant including obligations to dependents.”48 Essentially, this limitation all but
guaranteed that restitution awards did not exceed a perpetrator’s ability to pay.
Although the VWPA broadened the availability of restitution, Congress
determined that federal judges were still not ordering restitution frequently enough to
satisfy the objectives of the victims’ rights movement or the president’s task force,49 and
limiting courts’ discretion based on the offender’s circumstances continued to place
victims’ needs second.50 In response, Congress amended the VWPA with the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act in 1996.51 The MVRA, which instituted mandatory
restitution for certain crimes, was constructed to “reflect a fundamental shift in the
purpose of restitution . . . to an attempt to provide those who suffer the consequences
of crime with some means of recouping their personal and financial losses.”52 Congress
acknowledged the problem of offender indigence in requiring mandatory restitution,
yet yielded to the needs of victims who, it suggested, could benefit from even nominal
awards or be compensated if their perpetrator eventually obtained monetary resources

46. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1688. In other words, judges were limited to ordering restitution only as a

part of a probationary sentence. S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982). “As a matter of practice, even that
discretionary grant of authority [was] infrequently used and indifferently enforced. In this respect,
federal criminal courts [went] the way of their state counterparts, reducing restitution from being an
inevitable if not exclusive sanction to being an occasional afterthought.” Id.

47.

S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 32.

48. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (2006).
49. See S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 13 (1995). “Unfortunately, however, while significant strides have been

made since 1982 toward a more victim-centered justice system, much progress remains to be made in
the area of victim restitution.” Id. In 1994, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Annual
Report, federal courts ordered restitution in only 20.2% of criminal cases. Id.

50. See 141 Cong. Rec. H1302 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
51.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3663–64 (2006); see Dickman, supra note 20, at 1689 (“Congress’s primary
motivation in enacting the MVRA was the belief that the VWPA’s restitution framework had not
adequately compensated crime victims . . . Congress aspired to ensure that victims receive the restitution
that they are due.”).

52.

Beth Bates Holliday, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996 (18 U.S.C. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. Fed.2d 283 (2008) (analyzing cases defining who is a “victim”
for purposes of the MVRA).
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that would allow for payment.53 Essentially, Congress created the MVRA to make the
victim the “primary consideration in the sentencing process.”54
Accordingly, Congress enumerated certain offenses under the MVRA that
require a restitution order upon conviction.55 Offenses of sexual exploitation against
children, including the possession of child pornography, are crimes subject to the
MVRA.56 The MVRA mandates restitution be paid to the victim for “the full
amount of the victim’s losses,”57 which are defined as:
[C]osts incurred by the victim for—

(A)	medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;

(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;

(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and

(F)	any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the
offense.58

The statute has been the subject of debate and varying interpretations.59 As a result,
courts have disagreed on the proper application of the MVRA to the crime of
possession.60
III.	RESTITUTION IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FOR POSSESSION OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY

Both courts and commentators have requested that Congress provide guidance on
the application of the MVRA to crimes of possession.61 A brief investigation into the
current restitution framework as it is applied to possession cases demonstrates why
53.

S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995).

54. 141 Cong. Rec. H1302 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde). For a more detailed

discussion of the statutory history of criminal restitution and its evolution as applied to sex crimes, see
generally Bradley P. Reiss, Restitution Devolution?, 85 St. John’s L. Rev. 1621, 1627–30 (2011) (arguing
for a shift from restitution to a victim compensation fund).

55.

18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) (2006). “[I]n addition to any other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law, the
court shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.” Id. (emphasis added).

56. 18 U.S.C.A § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (West 2009). Section 2252A, which is the provision prohibiting the

possession of child pornography, is an offense listed under the same chapter as § 2259. Therefore,
mandatory restitution applies to the crime of possession. Id. § 2259(a).

57.

Id. § 2259(b)(1).

58. Id. § 2259(3).
59.

See, e.g., Jacques, supra note 18, at 1181–82 (arguing that the plain language of the statute is not clear).

60. E.g., id. at 1184 (acknowledging the disagreement among courts); see infra notes 68, 73 and accompanying

text.

61.

See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 54, at 1650 (citing United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796–97
(D.N.D. 2010)).
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Congress needs to take action to develop a new framework for compensating victims.
First, the current framework creates inconsistencies for both victims and offenders
because courts can either apply restitution—and do so in a wide range of amounts—or
decide against a restitution order completely. Second, restitution orders can often result
in disproportionate punishments that risk violating the Eighth Amendment and curtail
the accountability of producers. Third, restitution often fails to adequately restore
victims because victims are rarely able to collect awards from their defendants and the
total amount of restitution awarded regularly fails to reflect the actual rate at which the
crime of possession is committed against a single victim. Moreover, the procedural
steps to obtain restitution can be detrimental to victims, while other victims are often
left empty-handed because they are not identified prior to prosecution.
A. Application of Restitution in Possession Cases Has Created Harmful Inconsistencies

The majority of courts have interpreted the MVRA to require a finding of
proximate cause between the crime and the victim’s harm before ordering restitution
in the full amount of the victim’s losses.62 Proximate cause limits the legal
responsibility of an individual and demands a “direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”63 Therefore, in possession cases, the
question is whether a defendant, by viewing images of the victim, caused her harm in
the form of emotional and psychological suffering.
Finding a direct relationship between mere possession and the harm suffered by
the child is an abstract idea, which can involve “connect[ing] the dots” of causation in
a very attenuated manner. 64 This notion, that a person who possesses child
pornography directly harms the child victim, often draws criticism because it
“stretches personal accountability to the breaking point” and feels as though “forcing
payment from people who do not produce such images but only possess them goes
too far.”65 In other words, there is question as to how an individual can be required to
pay a specific victim when they did not physically touch, let alone personally harm,
that victim.66 Yet, on the other hand, victims are considered personally harmed by an
end-user because the victim’s knowledge of an individual viewing a record of his or

62. See, e.g., United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645 (6th

Cir. 2012); United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Monzel, 641
F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Laney, 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999). But see In
re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Christy, No. 10-cr-1534, 2012 WL
3255107 (D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2012).

63. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 154 (quoting Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
64. See John Schwartz, Court Rejects Restitution for Victim in Porn Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2011, at A20.
65.

Schwartz, supra note 10.

66. See id. (noting a sex crime expert’s view that the harm caused by possessors is less direct than the harm

caused by abusers).
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her abuse exacerbates the harm stemming from the original abuse.67 In turn, courts,
even within the same circuit, have reached no consensus on whether, and when, the
possession of child pornography is the proximate cause of a victim’s harm.68 This
disagreement has created inconsistencies not only for the criminal justice system, but
also for both victims and offenders.
First, this discrepancy creates inconsistencies that are problematic for both
defendants and victims because possession of an image in one jurisdiction may result
in a restitution order to the victim, but possession of the same image in another
jurisdiction may result in no restitution order.69 This fails to put a defendant on
notice of the potential punishment, which minimizes any deterrent effect restitution
might have.70 Further, victims end up gambling with their time and energy by
petitioning for restitution in jurisdictions that have found proximate cause in some
cases, but not in others.71 With only the mere possibility of restitution, a victim may
not only expend time, but also money on legal fees and costs, and suffer trauma from
testifying or making statements regarding the harm suffered.72
67.

See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (stating that “harm to child is exacerbated by [image]
circulation”); United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Having paid others to
‘act out’ for him, the victims are no less damaged for his having remained safely at home.”); United States
v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (“The victim’s knowledge of
publication of the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”).

68. Compare United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 659 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding proximate cause between the

victim’s harm and the possessor’s conduct), United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 459–60 (4th Cir.
2012) (same), United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2012) (same), United States v.
McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2011) (same), United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (same), United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 690 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (same),
United States v. Lundquist, 847 F. Supp. 2d 364, 370 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (same), United States v. Stowers,
No. cr-10-74, 2011 WL 3022188, at *3 (E.D. Okla. July 22, 2011), Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613–14
(same), Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (same), and United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009
WL 2579103, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (same), with United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218,
1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding a lack of proximate cause between the victim’s harm and the possessor’s
conduct), Aumais, 656 F.3d at 154 (same), United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir.
2011) (same), United States v. Martin, No. 2:10-cr-95, 2012 WL 3597436, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20,
2012) (same), United States v. Simon, No. CR-08-0907, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7,
2009) (same), and United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Dec. 17, 2009).

69. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1189 (“[T]here are two unfortunate, polar consequences: some courts bar

recovery for victims while others force offenders to pay large amounts that have attenuated connection
to the harm actually caused.”).

70. See Dennis F. DiBari, Restoring Restitution: The Role of Proximate Causation in Child Pornography

Possession Cases Where Restitution Is Sought, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 297, 310 (“Restitution’s ability to
closely track the harm caused by the crime functions as a powerful deterrent, since it warns potential
offenders that they will be responsible for every penny of harm they cause.”); In re Silverman, 616 F.3d
1001, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[R]estitution furthers the traditional sentencing goals of rehabilitation and
deterrence, by forcing defendants to directly witness the effects of their crimes.”).

71.

See cases cited supra note 68. For example, the Second Circuit found a lack of probable cause in Aumais,
but subsequently, a court in the Northern District of New York found the presence of proximate cause
in Lundquist.

72. See infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
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Among the courts that have found the presence of proximate cause in possession
cases, there is further disagreement on the proper way to calculate the amount of a
restitution order.73 Upon a finding of proximate causation, a court must calculate
how much restitution is warranted by estimating the specific losses caused by the
defendant.74 However, a court is left with a “legal quandary” because the MVRA
does not provide a specific calculation method.75 Without a designated method,
judges have full reign in determining their own.76 Not surprisingly, this has resulted
in a wide range of calculation methods and varying restitution amounts. Some courts
have adopted a set amount for each defendant convicted of possession.77 This amount
is based on a very small percentage of the civil remedy available to victims of child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which typically is around $3000 and equals
two percent of the $150,000 available under the civil statute.78 Other courts have
permitted the government and the defendant to stipulate to a restitution amount.79
One court granted restitution in the full amount of the victim’s losses, which totaled
a little over $3.5 million.80
This discrepancy in restitution awards also fails to put defendants on notice and
therefore reduces any deterrent effect restitution might have on possessors. Further,
victims are again placed in a risky position when petitioning for assistance. Therefore,
a more dependable and consistent system of compensation would not only benefit
victims, but also provide potential possessors with explicit notice of the potential
punishment upon conviction.
Not only does the application of restitution to possession cases create huge
discrepancies in award amounts, but it also places too much discretion in the hands of
the judiciary, which is inconsistent with the language and intent behind the MVRA.81
The lack of both guidance on proximate cause and a standard calculation method
73. McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1270 (“[W]e note that disparate decisions by district courts across the nation

demonstrate that there is no universal means for determining a proper restitution amount.”). The great
disparity among courts on these issues has sparked several in-depth analyses of case law nationwide. For
a detailed look into the these discrepancies and the cases mentioned in this note, see Reiss, supra note
54, at 1633–36; Giblin, supra note 42, at 1121–29; Jacques, supra note 18, at 1185–87.

74.

United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (“[Defendant]
is required to pay [the victim] the full amount of losses as a result of the harm she suffered.”).

75. United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009).
76. See id.
77.

See id. at *6; United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ferenci, No.
1:08-CR-0414, 2009 WL 2579102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08CR-0365, 2009 WL 2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009).

78. Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, at *6; 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Granato, No. 2:08-cr-198 (D. Nev. filed Aug. 28, 2009).
80. United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009). The court

calculated the full amount of the victim’s losses by adding the loss of future wages and employee benefits
through the age of sixty-seven with the future treatment and counseling costs through the age of eightyone, which totaled $3,680,153. Id.

81.

See Lewis, supra note 6, at 419–20.
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permits one judge to order a huge restitution sum, while another judge can decline
restitution altogether and, in effect, ignore the mandate of the MVRA, which states
that “the court shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.” 82 This
discretion does not comport with the plain language of the MVRA, nor is it consistent
with Congress’s intent, which was to make victims the primary consideration in
sentencing and restore them financially.83 Section 2259 applies to all offenses listed
under the chapter—which includes possession of child pornography—and explicitly
states that “[t]he issuance of a restitution order under this section is mandatory.”84
Clearly, “[t]hrough the enactment of the MVRA, Congress essentially decided that
defendants found guilty of crimes involving child pornography should never be able to
avoid an order of restitution and deny a victim monetary recourse for the harm caused
by being victimized through child pornography.” 85 Therefore, whether restitution
should be granted is not a decision that Congress placed with the courts; the legislature
stripped the judiciary of this discretion by making restitution mandatory.86 This
discretion, created from a lack of guidance, diverges from the spirit of the MVRA
and allows courts to overstep their authority.87
B. Restitution Orders Are Disproportionate to the Offense of Possession

The application of restitution to cases of possession also creates problems of
proportionality in punishment and liability. First, issuing restitution orders to
possessors lends itself to the risk of violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against excessive fines.88 Second, applying restitution to cases of possession can skew
the assignment of liability by disproportionately placing it on possessors rather than
on those who actually abused the children.89
Under the Eighth Amendment, a fine is deemed excessive when the payment is
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.90 A restitution order for $3.5 million,
like the one in United States v. Staples, could be viewed as disproportionate to the
gravity of possession.91 Requiring a huge sum from an individual who did not physically
82. 18 U.S.C § 2259(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
83. See id. (emphasis added); 141 Cong. Rec. H1302 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
85. Lewis, supra note 6, at 421–22; accord United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section

2259 is phrased in generous terms in order to compensate the victims of sexual abuse for the care
required to address the long term effects of their abuse.”).

86. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(A) (2006).
87.

Lewis, supra note 6, at 421–22.

88. See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1334.
89. Id. at 1344.
90. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry

under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”).

91.

No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009).
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abuse the victim or produce the image feels inherently unbalanced. Additionally, even
in the absence of a huge restitution amount, a restitution order can be disproportional
when there is no direct proof that the defendant’s conduct caused the specific losses.92
For instance, in United States v. Brunner, the court found that the victim impact
statements and psychological reports supported a finding of proximate cause, even
though neither document named the defendant personally.93 Findings such as these may
violate the Eighth Amendment because, when causation is not proven, a possessor could
be required to pay the victim for losses caused by other individuals.94 Any restitution
amount paid, therefore, would not be proportionate to the defendant’s offense.95
Additionally, ordering restitution from possessors can distort the assignment of
liability by failing to hold producers and distributors accountable.96 Beyond victim
restoration, traditional goals of restitution include deterrence and rehabilitation, both
of which can be satisfied in individual cases of possession “by forcing defendants to
directly witness the effects of their crime[].” 97 However, on a global scale, issuing
92.

See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 789 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“This Court is of the opinion
that a restitution order under section 2259 that is not limited to losses proximately caused by the
defendant’s conduct would under most facts, including these, violate the Eighth Amendment.”), vacated,
In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012).

93.

No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010).

94. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1334. In In re Amy Unknown, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that a

restitution order in the absence of proximate cause violated the Eighth Amendment. 701 F.3d at 752.
Specifically, the court found no Eighth Amendment concerns “[i]n light of restitution’s remedial nature,
§ 2259’s built-in causal requirements, and the mechanisms described under § 3664.” Id. at 772.
Although case law has offered little guidance on whether the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
excessive fines applies to restitution orders, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Eighth
Amendment applies to restitution orders so long as it is not “grossly disproportional to the defendant’s
culpability.” United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
17, 2009) (citing United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming MVRA
restitution awards in the amount of $121,403.10 and $4,510.00 for bank robbery and holding restitution
does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines, both facially and as
applied)); United States v. Seigel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Dubose
approvingly)). Additionally, whether possession defendants are subject to joint and several liability
under § 3664, forcing them to pay for others’ harms, is also unclear in the case law. See, e.g., United
States v. Veazie, No. 2:11-cr-00202, 2012 WL 1430540, at *4 n.7 (D. Me. Apr. 25, 2012) (citing United
States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). However, several courts have held that joint and
several liability is inappropriate where the defendant did not proximately cause all of the victim’s injuries
and where they would have to pay for the losses caused by defendants in separate cases, including losses
attributable to the initial abuse. Monzel, 641 F.3d at 538; Veazie, 2012 WL 1430540, at *4 n.7; United
States v. Olivieri, No. 09-cr-743, 2012 WL 1118763, at *10–11 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2012). Accordingly,
despite the Fifth Circuit’s recent findings, restitution orders in these cases may still raise Eighth
Amendment concerns.

95. See Dubose, 146 F.3d at 1145 (finding that restitution orders under the MVRA must not be grossly

disproportional to the crime committed to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment); Olivieri, 2012
WL 1118763, at *10; United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 188 n.5 (D. Me. 2009).

96. See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1344.
97.

In re Silverman, 616 F.3d 1001, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010); accord Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10
(1986) (“Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in
concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.”).
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restitution orders to possessors can actually “underdeter those who cause the greatest
harms”—the producers.98 Consider the example of “Amy,” who as a child was featured
in a widely viewed series of pornographic images:
[Her] uncle, her original abuser, paid only $6,000 in restitution. Yet, in the
first year alone, Amy received $170,000 in restitution from child pornography
possession defendants. She now seeks a total of $3.4 million from those who
possess her images. No matter how generously one “slices the pie” of fault, one
cannot imagine that the amount paid by the original abuse is a proportional
representation of his contribution to the harm.99

The disproportionate assignment of liability on possessors minimizes the extent to
which producers are responsible for a victim’s harm and for the child pornography
industry in general.100 In order to avoid these problems, Congress needs to create a
system that punishes possessors proportionately to the crime.
C. Restitution Fails to Restore Victims of Possession

One of the main purposes of restitution is to make the victim of a crime “whole”
again, or, in other words, “to restore someone to the position she occupied before a
particular event.”101 In this vein, the MVRA was established to “move ‘toward a
more victim-centered justice system,’ which would help transform a criminal justice
system that Congress believed was ignoring the plight of victims.” 102 The use of
restitution in possession cases, however, often fails to adequately restore victims;
specifically, victims rarely collect money from an order and the total amount of
restitution awarded per victim does not accurately ref lect the actual number of
individuals who view their images. Further, the process for obtaining restitution is in
fact detrimental to many victims, while other victims, who are not identified before
prosecution, are left empty-handed. Each of these issues is addressed in turn below.
First, the collection rate of restitution judgments is alarmingly low.103 Defendants
often lack the ability “to pay restitution because of incarceration, indigency, or
98. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1344.
99. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. See id. Notably, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Amy Unknown, addressed the “concern that individual

defendants may bear a greater restitutionary burden than others convicted of possessing the same
victim’s images” and found that this concern does not implicate an absurd result. 701 F.3d 749, 772 (5th
Cir. 2012). However, this concern is different from the one suggested by this note; specifically, that
possessors will bear a greater burden of the restitutionary burden than those causing greater harm to the
victims, the abusers and producers.

101. United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (citing

Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990)); accord United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597,
603 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Courts have found that restitution is not only a means of making a victims
whole, but also serves punitive and rehabilitative purposes.”).

102. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1689 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 13 (1995)).
103. See, e.g., Office for Victims of Crime, Restitution: Making It Work 1 (Nov. 2002), available at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin5/ncj189193.pdf. Although there is
limited data on the collection of restitution on a national level, a recent study of restitution in Colorado
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unemployment.”104 Therefore, victims who risk the time and emotional energy to
request restitution from possessors may wait indefinitely to see any portion of their
judgment. Further, if a victim does in fact receive her full award, she will have to pay
a large portion—in most cases one-third of her judgment—to her attorney in fees
and costs.105 The false hope created by an order can only compound the existing
mental and emotional pain experienced by victims of child pornography.106 This
limited recovery of money may force victims, and the community, to lose respect for
and satisfaction in the criminal justice system.107 Also, from a financial cost-benefit
analysis standpoint, staffing and running programs to collect restitution often cost
more than the amount of money requested in the order.108 This suggests that an
alternative to restitution could provide a more beneficial use of state resources—for
instance, by placing these additional funds into a compensation fund for victims.109
The staggering amount of end-users and the consistent circulation of images also
demonstrate why restitution can be improper for possession cases.110 The rate at which
can provide insight. See id. at 1, 4. In 1996, offenders in Colorado were ordered to pay their victims $26
million, but as of 2002 they still owed more than $20 million. Id. at 1; see also Jacques, supra note 18, at
1195 (“Getting a judge’s order is one matter; a convict’s payment is another.”).
104. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1195.

Over 85 percent of federal criminal defendants are indigent at the time of their arrest,
and nearly half of offenders made less than $600 during the month prior to their offense.
Moreover, the government often seizes the assets an offender may accumulate from his
or her illegal activity prior to conviction, making these assets unavailable for the
satisfaction of restitution judgments. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the
economic situation of most inmates does not improve upon release. The average inmate
has little in the way of education or marketable job skills, and job opportunities tend to
be limited in the communities to which prisoners return. Moreover, a criminal conviction
frequently acts as a major impediment to employment.

Dickman, supra note 20, 1695 (citations omitted).

105. Reiss, supra note 54, at 1641. In 2010, one victim had been awarded $40,000 in restitution, yet received

only $10,000, while the rest went towards attorney’s fees and advanced costs. Id. (citing United States v.
Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).

106. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1689–99. “Supporting this notion is the fact that probation officers and

prosecutors report having to help victims who are granted a restitution order to see it as a ‘symbolic
victory,’ so that victims are not significantly let down when they do not ultimately receive restitution
from the offender.” Id. (citations omitted).

107. Id. at 1700–01.
108. Id. at 1708–09 (“[F]or many restitution judgments, the government is spending considerably more than

the offender can be expected to pay or the victim can be expected to receive.”); Reiss, supra note 54, at
1639–40 (noting that awarding restitution involves “use of expert testimony, additional evidentiary
hearings, further briefing, appeals, and added procedual technicalities if the victim is a minor,” which
drive up administrative costs).

109. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1708 (“The reason that such programs often do not withstand economic

scrutiny is that when the sole aim is to reimburse victims, the cost of staffing and running programs
relative to the funds collected might suggest that public monies would better be provided directly to
crime victims through crime victim compensation programs.”) (citation omitted).

110. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1342.
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individuals view and receive child pornography, even with respect to one specific
image or victim, is much higher than the rate at which those offenders are apprehended
and convicted.111 Consequently, victims are never fully restored and made whole. For
instance, consider again “Amy,” who is the principle victim in one of the most
commonly circulated collections of child pornography, the “Misty” series.112 Research
conducted by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)
has uncovered a total of 35,750 images associated with the Misty series and, in 2009
alone, found 8860 images associated with the same series.113 Next, consider the federal
prosecution rate of child pornography crimes, which in 2006 was a mere 1203 cases.114
Comparing these numbers demonstrates how a victim, such as “Amy,” whose original
harm is exacerbated with each viewing, can never actually recover the full amount of
restitution theoretically owed to her; the number of images available increases the
number of possessors, the majority of which will never be prosecuted based on the
current statistics.115 Under the “restorative view” of criminal justice—which serves as
the premise of the MVRA—a crime is a violation of a victim’s right and provides a
benefit to the offender, which creates an imbalance between them.116 Restitution, in
turn, should strive to rectify this imbalance.117 In cases of possession, however, this
imbalance cannot be fully cured when any amount a victim receives will be so
disproportionate to the actual number of offenders viewing the images; a victim under
this framework cannot be made whole.
Additionally, the process by which victims petition for restitution under the
current framework contains several prerequisites that are counterintuitive to the
victim-centered goals of restitution. First, victims are notified each time an offender
has been arrested for possessing the victim’s image.118 In order to receive restitution,
a victim must then send a request to the prosecutor, who will present the claim to the
court at sentencing.119 Therefore, these notifications are essential in providing victims
with opportunity for restitution. As one can imagine, however, these notifications
add to the lasting psychological harm of the victim.120 A victim named “Vicky,” who
is the subject of a widespread series of images, explained this as follows:
111. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1702.
112. Giblin, supra note 42, at 1111.
113. Id. at 1110 n.8.
114. Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice; BJS Bull. No. NCJ 219412, Federal

Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders, 2006 2 (2007). This statistic does not specify
the prosecution rate for the individual crimes of possession, distribution, and production, but
encompasses all child pornography related crimes.

115. See Dickman, supra note 20, at 1702.
116. See Giblin, supra note 42, at 1116–17.
117. Id.
118. See sources cited supra note 21.
119. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1331.
120. See United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2010).

957

The Proper Remedy for Possession of Child Pornography

I learn about each [defendant] because of the Victim Notices. I have a right to
know who has the pictures of me. The Notice puts [a] name on the fear that I
already had and also adds to it. When I learn about one defendant having
downloaded the pictures of me, it adds to my paranoia, it makes me feel again
like I was being abused by another man who had been leering at pictures of my
naked body being tortured, it gives me chills to think about it. I live in fear that
any of them[] may try to find me and contact me and do something to me.121

Although victim notifications were implemented to aid victims, the effects of the
notifications can clearly be detrimental to victims.122 Under the current framework,
however, these notifications are an unavoidable evil if victims want to receive restitution.
Next, the current restitution framework relies on victim identification.123
Offenders cannot be ordered to pay restitution unless there is an identified victim;
yet law enforcement consistently has difficulty identifying victims because of the
Internet’s anonymity.124 Further, the efforts in locating victims are also frustrated
because a large percentage of child pornography is produced in foreign countries.125
The distance and “insufficient political will” of some foreign countries can hinder
overseas efforts,126 complicating an already difficult task that requires the cooperation
of both domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies.127 Consequently, an operation
to locate victims abroad, if successful, can take a significant amount of time.
Therefore, victims who may be identified after a prosecution are not able to recover
restitution from that possessor, yet at the same time guilty offenders are freed from
121. Id.
122. E.g., id.
123. See Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194.
124. Id.; Chelsea McLean, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 Cornell J.L. &

Pub. Pol’y 221, 237 n.149 (2007) (noting that the “only records of online pornography trading are logs”
that “are often discarded”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation
Prevention and Interdiction: Report to Congress 3 (2010) [hereinafter National Strategy].
Federal law enforcement agencies have specific agencies dedicated to combating child pornography, such
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Innocent Images National Initiative, the Department of Justice’s
Child and Exploitation and Obscenity Section, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s
(ICE) Cyber Crimes Center. Alongside state taskforces, these federal agencies work together to keep
each other informed on the identities of both offenders and victims. See Michael J. Henzey, Going on the
Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal
Action, 11 Appalachian J. L. 1, 38–39 (2011) (providing an overview of federal law enforcement agencies
and their tactics in fighting child pornography). Most importantly, these agencies utilize NCMEC,
which is a non-profit organization that runs a national tip-line and Child Victim Identification Program
(CVIP). Id. The CVIP is the central repository for information regarding identified children of child
pornography images. Id.

125. See Jacques, supra note 18, 1194.
126. ECPAT Int’l, Global Monitoring: Status of Action Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 19

(2012), http://www.ecpat.net/EI/Pdf/A4A_II/A4A_V2_AM_USA.pdf.

127. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 124, at 57. The International Criminal Police Organization

(INTERPOL) in Washinton, D.C. works with ICE, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and
NCMEC, along with domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies, to locate unidentified and
missing victims of child exploitation. Id.
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the responsibility of paying for a victim’s losses.128 This result is unfair and undermines
the fundamental premise of restitution: to restore victims.129
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD IMPLEMENT A VICTIMS COMPENSATION PROGRAM

Guidance from Congress on the proper application of the MVRA in cases of
child possession would not eliminate the problems with the current restitution
framework. Therefore, instead, Congress should remove the crime of possession
from the MVRA’s mandatory restitution.130 Simultaneously, Congress should create
a national crime victims compensation program specifically designed to allow victims
of child pornography to claim compensation for the harm caused by possessors.131
This new system, funded by fines paid by offenders, will provide consistency to
victims and offenders, lessen the possibility of disproportionate punishments and
unbalanced liability, and satisfy victim needs.
Abandoning the current criminal restitution framework in exchange for a
compensation program for victims of possession was first suggested in United States
v. Paroline. Judge Leonard Davis explained in a footnote:
While Congress was obviously well intended in attempting to create a
statutory framework to help compensate victims of child pornography, it has
unfortunately created one that is largely unworkable in the context of criminal
restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 2255, however, does provide a civil remedy for those
victims able to obtain counsel to pursue it. There is a great need for counseling
and medical care for victims of child pornography. Perhaps a statutory
provision requiring that fines for child pornography be paid to a national center
that would act as a trustee to disburse funds for counseling of victims of child
pornography would do more to help these victims than the seemingly
unworkable criminal restitution provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 2259.132

In recognizing the current framework as “unworkable,” Judge Davis recommended a
transition to an independent system to adequately compensate victims.133 Crime
victim compensation programs are consistently praised for providing victims with
the monetary funds necessary to recover from their victimization.134 These programs
128. See Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194.
129. See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. Renga, No.

1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009).

130. See generally McLeod, supra note 17, at 1342–45 (explaining the serious policy concerns associated with

holding possessors liable under § 2259).

131. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, In re Amy

Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012).

132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. See id.
134. E.g., Frédéric Mégret, Justifying Compensation by the International Criminal Court’s Victims Trust Fund:

Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes, 36 Brook. J. Int’l L. 123, 131 (2010) (finding that the
emergence of compensation programs “ranks as one of the most significant criminological developments in
the Western world and beyond of the last four decades”); Benedict J. Monachino, Enhancing Victims’ Rights:
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have been used to provide organized relief to victims in a variety of contexts. For
instance, funds have been established in mass tort class action lawsuits, including the
asbestos and Diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases, and also in emergency situations for
victims of crime or national disasters, most notably the 9/11 Victim Compensation
Fund, the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund, and the BP Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.135
The most common funds, however, are state-level compensation programs, which
provide assistance to victims of both federal and state crimes.136
In creating a new system, Congress should use the International Terrorism
Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP) as a model.137 ITVERP is the
only federally administered compensation program designed to assist victims of a
specific crime.138 The program was created under the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA)
and allows eligible victims of international terrorism to claim compensation for their
victimization directly from a designated federal fund.139 Adopting a program similar
to ITVERP, with some modifications, would eliminate the problems presented by
the current restitution framework as applied to the crime of possession.
A. ITVERP Background

ITVERP was created in part to resolve a discrepancy in victim compensation.140
Currently, victims of both federal and state crimes are primarily compensated through
state programs, which each have their own policies for awarding compensation.141 As
a result, victims of the same act of terrorism were receiving different amounts of

Crime Victims Compensation, 80 N.Y. St. B.J. 36, 41 (Mar./Apr. 2008) (“[C]rime victims compensation has
become a vibrant force in advancing the rights of victims. Each time compensation benefits are expanded,
crime victims are another step closer to restoring balance to the criminal justice system.”).
135. See Reiss, supra note 54, at 1644–45; see also Guidelines for the Anti-Terrorism and Emergency

Assistance Program for Terrorism and Mass Violence Crimes, 67 Fed. Reg. 4822, 4825 (Jan. 31, 2002)
(“[The Office for Victims of Crime]’s mission is to enhance the nation’s capacity to assist victims of
crime and . . . to promote justice and healing for all victims” by, in addition to other programs,
establishing a compensation program for victims of international terrorism).

136. See infra note 141.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 10603c (2006).
138. See source cited infra note 142; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(3)(A) (2006).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(d)(5)(B) (2006) (granting the Office of Victims of Crime power to use federal

funds for ITVERP); id. § 10603c(b) (establishing an award of compensation to victims of international
terrorism from the federal Crime Victims Fund).

140. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518 (proposed Aug.

24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94).

141. 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(5) (2006). The federal Crime Victims Fund allocates monies to eligible state

crime victim compensation programs. Id. § 10601(d)(4)(A). State crime victim compensation programs
are only eligible for funding if they “provide compensation to victims of Federal crimes occurring within
the State on the same basis that such program provides compensation to victims of State crimes.” Id.
§ 10602(b)(5).

960

N

VOLUME 57 | 2012/13

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

compensation.142 In response, Congress stripped states of their obligation to
compensate victims of international terrorism and created ITVERP as an independent,
federal program.143
Under ITVERP, the federal government is required to “ensure[] that victims
from all 50 states, including the U.S. territories and United States employees in
foreign countries, will receive fair and equitable reimbursement for comparable
expenses.”144 Specifically, ITVERP allows claimants to seek reimbursement for the
following: (1) medical expenses up to $50,000; (2) mental health care costs not to
exceed $5000; (3) property loss, repair, or replacement costs not to exceed $10,000;
(4) funeral and burial costs not to exceed $25,000; and (5) miscellaneous expenses
(such as lodging, emergency travel, local transportation, and telephone costs) not to
exceed $15,000.145
Eligible claimants under ITVERP include U.S. nationals and U.S. government
officers and employees who have “suffered direct physical or emotional injury or death
as a result of international terrorism on or after October 23, 1983, with respect to which
an investigation of civil or criminal prosecution was ongoing after April 24, 1996.”146
Unlike state compensation programs, which either promote or require victim cooperation
with law enforcement, ITVERP does not require similar participation;147 it simply
requires that there be an investigation of, or prosecution related to, the act of terrorism.148
This framework allows victims to claim compensation without suffering through the
hardships attached to testifying or participating in the criminal justice process.149
142. Office for Victims of Crime, International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement

Program: Report to Congress 3 (2008) [hereinafter ITVERP Report].

Id.

Each state determines the level of compensation and assistance for crime victims via
state legislation. Prior to ITVERP, a victim’s only recourse was compensation through
state programs. This was problematic because survivors of the same act of terrorism
outside the United States, who are residents of different states, may conceivably receive
different levels of compensation for similar injuries from their state programs.

143. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518 (proposed Aug.

24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94). “Partially in recognition of this disparity in treatment, VOCA
was amended so that states shall no longer be required to compensate victims of international terrorism
occurring outside the United States, and the federal government shall oversee an expense reimbursement
program for these victims.” Id.; see Victims of Trafficking Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. 106386, §
2003(c)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1544–46 (2000).

144. ITVERP Report, supra note 142, at 1.
145. Id. at 5.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
147. See id. § 10603c(a)–(c).
148. Id.
149. As a child victim of sexual exploitation, one can experience increased levels of shame by retelling their

story during the course of the criminal justice system proceedings. See William Wesley Patton, Viewing
Child Witnesses Through a Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Proceedings Lens: How Attorneys’ Ethical Duties
Exacerbate Children’s Psychopathology, 16 Widener L. Rev. 369, 376–77 (2010). Additionally, “[t]he
process of testifying and of being cross-examined is obviously contraindicated with psychiatric
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ITVERP is supported by the Crime Victims Fund, which was established by
VOCA, and is primarily funded by criminal fines, fees, penalty assessments, and
forfeitures paid by federal offenders.150 The Crime Victims Fund is typically delegated
to state victim compensation programs; however, a portion of the fund is reserved for
ITVERP. As a result, states are stripped of their obligation to compensate victims of
international terrorism and, instead, these victims collect compensation solely
through ITVERP.151
B. ITVERP Is the Most Appropriate Model for the Fund
		

1. ITVERP Model Would Create Consistency for Possession Victims

Similarly to ITVERP, which was established on a federal level to eliminate the
inconsistencies in state compensation programs, Congress needs to create a new
federal system for restoring victims of child pornography and avoiding the
inconsistencies created by the current restitution system.
Using ITVERP as a model, the new program for victims of child pornography
should disperse funds to victims equally and consistently. However, Congress would
not reimburse victims for the same expenses as victims of international terrorism.152
Instead, the new program should compensate victims only for their mental and
psychological suffering arising from the possession of their images.153 As a result, the
new program would be less complicated and more predictable than ITVERP.
Additionally, this new program should issue a single, standard dollar amount to
eligible victim-claimants, regardless of the number of images of them available or
the number of known possessors.154 Unlike ITVERP, which calculates reimbursement
on an individual basis, each victim of child pornography should receive the same
amount of compensation in order to cover the mental health expenses related to
procedures aimed at helping abused children regain emotional health.” Id. at 375. For instance, while
mental health professionals attempt to provide patients with a safe and nonjudgmental environment for
disclosure, testifying in a courtroom full of strangers fails to provide that recommended environment.
See id. Further, traveling to participate in the criminal justice process can also put an additional financial
burden on victims.
150. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518, 49518 (proposed

Aug. 24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94).

151. Id.
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (quoting

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982)) (“The victim’s knowledge of publication of the visual
material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”). Victims of child pornography
can also pursue remedies through civil tort actions against their producers, distributors, and possessors.
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). This new system would provide victims with an opportunity to easily and
efficiently obtain compensation for only the mental health expenses related to the possession of their
images.

154. See Reiss, supra note 54, at 1643–48 (arguing for the implementation of a compensation program for

child pornography victims and asserting that a standard award amount would benefit victims and create
equality).
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recovering from the effects of possessors viewing his or her images. Undeniably, each
victim’s experience is unique and each recovery will vary in cost. Accordingly, this
standard amount will likely be subject to criticism for failing to consider the
individual characteristics of each victim’s situation, such as the number of images in
circulation and the exacerbated effect on a victim.155 Yet, providing a standard
compensation amount would eliminate judicial discretion, create consistency, and
would be easier to administer than restitution. The question of proximate cause,
moreover, which has split courts and as a result created a huge disparity among
restitution awards for victims, would be inapposite because nationwide victims would
receive equal compensation for their suffering without having to prove that their
harm directly resulted from an offender possessing their image.
On the other side of the equation, under this proposed model, Congress will also
need to require a standard fine from those convicted of possessing child pornography.156
This standard fine will create a proportional penalty for possessors that adheres to the
traditional punitive motives behind restitution. A standard fine will also provide
notice to offenders, in contrast to the current framework, whereby an offender could
be ordered to pay millions of dollars or nothing at all. Convicted possessors will pay
their fine directly to the Crime Victims Fund and, similar to ITVERP, Congress
would funnel these monies directly into a trust within the Crime Victims Fund
specifically designated for this program. In addition, Congress will need to forgive
states of their obligation to compensate victims of the crime of possession, if their
program typically compensated for the crime of possession.157
		

2. ITVERP Model Provides for Proportional Punishment

The standard fine required from possessors should be proportional to the crime
while also recognizing the seriousness of the harm created.158 Determining the
amount of this fine will require complex policy and economic considerations. Several
factors, however, should be thoroughly reviewed in making this determination. The
155. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986).

Id.

Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to
confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. Such a penalty will affect
the defendant differently than a traditional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and
impersonal entity, and often calculated without regard to the harm the defendant caused.
Similarly, the direct relation between the harm and the punishment gives restitution a
more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine.

156. See Jacques, supra note 18, at 1196.
157. State compensation programs are eligible to receive support from the Crime Victims Fund if they

compensate victims of criminal “violence.” 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (2006). State legislatures define
those acts that constitute “violence” and therefore may or may not compensate victims for the possession
of child pornography, which is not inherently a violent act.

158. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry

under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”).
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first consideration should be the high rate of indigence among criminal defendants.159
Although the amount needs to be large enough to help support the fund and reflect
the seriousness of the crime, the fine must be practical and manageable for offenders
with little means.160 Issuing an extremely high fine would only perpetuate the
problems with collection under the current restitution framework.
Second, the proportion of liability imposed on possessors, as compared to
producers and distributors, should be considered in setting the standard amount
issued to victims. The existence of proximate cause between a producer or abuser’s
actions and a victim’s harm has not been contested.161 When courts have applied the
MVRA to crimes of production and distribution, the issue of proximate cause has
not precluded restitution awards, nor has it provoked extensive statutory
interpretation.162 The MVRA works effectively in these cases and therefore should
remain unchanged in its application to production and distribution of child
pornography.163 Thus, in some cases, a victim eligible under the new program may
have already received or will receive restitution from the producer or a distributor
when he or she applies for compensation. Policymakers, in turn, should consider the
possibility of this additional award and ensure that the standard amount provided to
victims of possession globally reflects the portion of harm caused by possessors in
the circle of abuse that also includes producers, distributors, and countless other endusers.164
159. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 104 and accompanying text
161. See United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190–91 (D. Me. 2009) (“It has long been uncontroversial

to order restitution when the defendant is convicted of actual physical abuse of a child or of producing
images constituting child pornography.”).

162. United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding restitution award under the

MVRA in production and abuse case); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1246–48 (10th Cir. 2001)
(same). Typically, when a defendant is convicted of distribution they are also convicted of production
and/or possession. At this point, there are no cases applying the MVRA solely to the crime of
distribution. Accordingly, it is an assumption to say that the crime of distribution does not create the
same questions regarding proximate cause as the crime of possession.

163. Undoubtedly, some of the problems present in possession cases can also be found in production and

distribution cases when the MVRA is applied. Specifically, low collection rates and issues with victim
notifications and identification also exist in those cases. Overall, however, the lack of problems relating
to consistency and proportionality in production and distribution cases has made the application of
restitution uncontroversial. See Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 189–92. In determining the scope of the victim
compensation program, policymakers should consider imposing fines on offenders who have distributed
child pornography including images of unidentified victims, which may provide an additional level of
punishment and deterrence, while also funding the program.

164. United States v. Veazie, No. 2:11-cr-00202, 2012 WL 1430540, at *5 (D. Me. Apr. 25, 2012).

The various defendants who have caused [a victim] harm—through creation, distribution,
and possession of child pornography depicting her abuse—have caused harm in
substantively different ways and, presumably, in differing amounts. A defendant found
guilty of distributing child pornography has committed a substantively different offense
than a defendant found guilty of possession of child pornography and, presumably, the
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A starting point for the determination of a standard amount may be an examination
of the civil remedy statute available for victims of child pornography, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a), which has served as the basis of several courts’ restitution calculations.165
This statute provides that any victim who, as a child, suffered personal injury as a
result of sexual exploitation “shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less
than $150,000 in value.”166 By establishing a high dollar amount for damages for these
crimes, Congress was cognizant of the great harm caused by child pornography.167
However, requiring a fine near $150,000 would fail to consider the proportionality of
the crime of possession to the crime of production or abuse.168 Therefore, by spreading
the $150,000 of damages across possessors and requiring a percentage of that sum as
a fine, the amount paid by possessors would be more proportional to their actual
crimes.169 This would eliminate the Eighth Amendment concerns presented by the
current restitution framework.
		

3. ITVERP Model Restores Victims

A victim-centered fund, modeled after ITVERP, would eliminate the problems
created by the current restitution framework that regularly leave victims unsatisfied.
Like ITVERP, compensation under the new program should be made available to all
eligible victims of child pornography, regardless of their participation in the criminal
prosecution of their offender.170 Congress should not require victims of child pornography
to participate in law enforcement efforts in order to receive compensation. Instead,
Congress should simply require victims to prove that they are a child pornography
victim and that their images are in or have been in circulation on the Internet. Both
evidence of a prosecution or investigation of an offender, including police and prosecutor
records, or verification from NCMEC’s Child Victim Identification program could

Id.

level of harm attributable to one who distributes and possesses child pornography differs
from the level of harm attributable to one guilty of possessing images of child pornography.

165. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006). The statute applies to “[a]ny person, who while a minor, was a victim of a

violation of section . . . 2252A . . . and who suffers personal injury as a result of such injury.” Id. Section
2252A is the federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography. Id. § 2252A.

167. Section 2255 originally provided damages for no less than $50,000. However, the text of the statute was

changed to $150,000 as an amendment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006 “to protect children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child
pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh and other child
crime victims.” Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 707, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).

168. See United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009)

(holding that comparing possession of images to direct abuse or production supports the finding that
simple receipt causes less than $150,000 in harm).

169. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1196 (“[S]preading of funds required for victims across every offender should

make the amount paid more proportional to the crime committed, while also preventing excessive order
amounts on individual defendants.”).

170. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10603c(3)(A)(i) (West 2008).
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prove an individual’s status as a child pornography victim.171 Further like ITVERP,
victims will also have to show that they have suffered “emotional injury” as a result.172
By providing compensation without requiring victims’ law enforcement
participation, Congress will eliminate the victim-related problems in applying
restitution to cases of possession. First and foremost, requiring all possessors to pay
into the fund, regardless of whether a victim is identified or is participating in the
prosecution, will provide compensation to those victims whose possessors are not yet
apprehended or convicted.173 This will eliminate the injustices created by the current
restitution framework when possessors are able to avoid paying restitution because the
victims cannot be identified in images and when victims are prohibited from petitioning
for assistance because their possessors have not been apprehended.174 Victims would
also avoid waiting indefinitely to receive compensation from their offenders and would
avoid receiving regular notifications reminding them of their victimization. As a result,
the suggested fund will give life to the victim-centered objectives of restitution.
Further, victim participation in the investigation or prosecution of a perpetrator
may cause additional trauma and frustrate the healing process, especially for
children.175 The current framework requires victims to prove that they were harmed
by the possessor through victim impact statements, expert evaluations, and testimony,
which may not only traumatize victims, but may make them feel as though they
themselves are on trial.176 Instead of slowing the healing process, the new program
171. See supra note 124.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(3)(A)(i) (2006).
173. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194–95 (“If courts imposed mandatory fines on all child pornography

offenders, wrongdoers could not escape the duty Congress created to compensate their victims, and the
overall amount of resources available to victims should increase.”).

174. See id. at 1194.
175. See Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault v. The

Accused’s Right to Confrontation, 18 Law & Psychol. Rev. 439, 445–46 (1994).

Id.

The impact of the emotional distress involved in court testimony can stay with a child
into adulthood. The child is likely to develop at a slower rate than his or her peers
because trauma during childhood can delay normal cognitive and emotional
development. In a comparison of effects of the legal process on child victims who had
testified in court and others who had not testified, those children who testified were
shown to have notably greater distress both seven months after testifying and after the
conclusion of the legal process. Evidence of this increased distress was in the form of
depression, anxiety, and some psychosomatic symptoms. Due to the interruption in
childhood development, the negative consequences of involvement in the legal process
can be more momentous for a child than it would be for an adult.

176. See id. at 441–42.

Id.

Research indicates that the more interviews a child is subjected to, the more harmful
the process is to the child. The number of times a child must repeat her story is one of
the strongest predictors of trauma. Multiple exposures to stressful events can reduce the
child’s resilience and make the child more susceptible to distress.
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will promote a victim’s healing process by validating them and lessening their
emotional suffering through an non-confrontational and direct compensation process.
On the other hand, this new compensation program may be subject to criticism for
failing to provide the benefits of individual retribution as between a victim and his or
her offender.177 Yet, given the problems with the current framework, the consistency
and redress created by this program will most likely outweigh retribution.
A compensation program will also provide additional benefits to victims and the
criminal justice system and promote the traditional values behind restitution. Providing
a guaranteed sum of money, rather than a substantial, but potentially uncollectable,
restitution sum will likely draw greater victim satisfaction than the current framework,
especially because “victim satisfaction is best achieved when collection rates are high,
even when increasing compliance comes at the expense of reducing the amount of the
restitution judgment.”178 Furthermore, shifting away from the criminal system will
save administrative costs associated with restitution.179 Additionally, possessor’s fines,
paid into the victim fund, may advance the traditional objectives of restitution, despite
not providing money directly to an individual victim.180 Requiring possessors to pay a
fine, in addition to any other prescribed consequence, can act as both a deterrent and a
punishment while also restoring victims.181
		

4. How to Create the Fund

To start, Congress would first have to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2252A—which is the
federal statute prohibiting the possession or receipt of child pornography—and
require a standard fine for those convicted under the statute.182 Congress would also
need to eliminate the crime of child pornography possession from the list of
enumerated offenses triggering mandatory restitution under the MVRA.183 After
these changes, in order to create this new federal compensation program, Congress
would need to amend VOCA in the same way it did for ITVERP.
VOCA instituted the Crime Victims Fund184 with the purpose of “financ[ing]
payments to State and Federal victims compensation and assistance programs.”185 In
1988, Congress formally established the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) with a
177. See id. at 440–41 (noting the legal process can be beneficial to victims, but most often when the children

have additional familial support).

178. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1699.
179. For example, court costs in determining the amount of victims’ losses and paying both prosecutors and

defense attorneys in restitution proceedings. Id. at 1709.

180. See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Courts have found that restitution

is not only a means of making a victim whole, but also serves punitive and rehabilitative purposes.”).

181. See Note, supra note 12, at 938 (“Like a fine, restitution can also be an effective deterrent.”).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006).
183. Id. § 2259(a).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006).
185. United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-497, at 4–5 (1984)).
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mission “to enhance the nation’s capacity to assist victims of crime and to provide
leadership in changing attitudes, policies, and practices to promote justice and healing
for all victims of crime.”186 Most importantly, OVC’s main role is to administer the
Crime Victims Fund.187 Additionally, the OVC is authorized to set aside $50 million
from the Crime Victims Fund to support an Anti-Terrorism Emergency Reserve.188
This reserve provides supplemental funds to state compensation programs for
emergency relief in the aftermath of acts of terrorism or mass violence.189
A 2000 VOCA amendment authorized the director of the OVC to establish
ITVERP, which would “reimburse eligible direct victims of acts of international
terrorism that occurred outside the United States for expenses associated with that
victimization.”190 The OVC director was also authorized to use the Anti-Terrorism
Emergency Reserve to fund ITVERP.191 As stated above, the program placed the
burden of compensating victims of international terrorism on the federal government.192
In order to create a new federal compensation system, Congress would need to
again amend VOCA, this time to authorize the OVC with the power to create and
oversee the new program193 and carve out funds from the Crime Victims Fund to
support the new program. However, unlike ITVERP, which is funded through the
Anti-Terrorism Emergency Reserve, Congress would need to designate a specific
amount of financial assets from the Crime Victims Fund to support this program.194
Congress would then set up a separate trust within the Crime Victims Fund to hold all
convicted possessor fines. Accordingly, Congress would be carving out only the second
federal program to directly compensate victims outside of emergency situations.195
V. CONCLUSION

In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court suggested the most efficient way to
destroy the child pornography industry would be “to dry up the market for this
186. Guidelines for the Anti-Terrorism and Emergency Assistance Program for Terrorism and Mass Violence

Crimes, 67 Fed. Reg. 4822, 4825 (Jan. 31, 2002). Accord 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006).

187. 42 U.S.C. § 10601(c)(1) (2006).
188. Id. § 10601(d)(5)(A).
189. Id. §§ 10601(d)(5)(B), 10603b(b).
190. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518 (proposed Aug.

24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(b)
(2006).

191. 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(b) (2006).
192. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518, 49519 (proposed

Aug. 24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94).

193. See 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(b) (2006).
194. See id. §§ 10601(d)(5)(B), 10603c(b).
195. See International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518, 49519

(proposed Aug. 24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94). Currently, ITVERP is the only existing federal
program to provide direct financial assistance to victims, outside of emergency assistance funds.
ITVERP Report, supra note 142, at 19.
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material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or
otherwise promoting the product.”196 Unfortunately, the sheer scope of this business
and its use of advanced technology decrease the likelihood that the market will dry
up anytime soon.197 Therefore, alongside continued law enforcement efforts, we must
adequately redress the harms caused by this heinous crime. This includes remedying
the detrimental effects of mere possession on victims and ensuring that victims are
made whole.
As this note has explained, the current approach to restitution is not a suitable
solution for the crime of possession. While restitution is supposed to both restore a
victim and punish a defendant, neither objective is met in cases of possession.
Further, restitution as applied to possession creates inconsistencies and risks violating
the Eighth Amendment. Shifting to a victim compensation program would alleviate
these problems and properly address the “seemingly unworkable criminal restitution”
framework.198 Furthermore, modeling the program after ITVERP, with appropriate
modifications, would provide additional advantages. For instance, victims would
avoid the inconsistencies created by state programs and obtain compensation
regardless of their participation in the prosecution of their offenders. This new
program is the proper remedy for the crime of possession and, more importantly,
provides the most competent framework to compensate victims for the “slow acid
drip” of trauma caused by the mere possession of child pornography.199

196. 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
197. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209, 234 (2001).

New technologies have changed the methods of distribution and production. Though
new laws proliferate to combat the new technology . . . , law enforcement officials still
expect that child pornography is going to rapidly explode as a cottage industry. Despite
all our efforts, we are now in the golden age of child pornography.

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

198. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
199. See United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1209 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
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